@qmilab/lodestar-cli

@qmilab/lodestar-cli

The lodestar command-line interface.

Commands

lodestar report <session-id> — headline command

Render a markdown trust report for a session. Resolves the project directory under the log root automatically; pass --project to disambiguate when multiple projects share a session id.

lodestar report session-1779551238212
lodestar report session-1779551238212 --out trust.md
lodestar report session-1779551238212 --raw-events 25

lodestar otel export <session-id> — OpenTelemetry bridge

Project a session's event log into OpenTelemetry GenAI spans and emit them as OTLP/HTTP JSON, so the epistemic chain shows up in Langfuse, Phoenix, Jaeger, or Tempo. With --endpoint, the trace is POSTed to a collector; with --out, it is written to a file; with neither (or --stdout), it is printed to stdout — a dry run that needs no collector. Content above --sensitivity-ceiling (default internal) is withheld: the span ships with structural metadata and the payload hash only.

lodestar otel export session-1779551238212 --stdout
lodestar otel export session-1779551238212 --endpoint http://localhost:4318
lodestar otel export session-1779551238212 \
  --sensitivity-ceiling confidential \
  --header "authorization=Bearer $TOKEN" --out trace.json

lodestar guard wrap --target <module> — programmatic surface

Import a TS module that default-exports an AgentLoop and run it under a guarded session. The CLI prints the session id so you can immediately render the report.

lodestar guard wrap --target ./my-agent.ts --actor alice
lodestar report <session-id>

The target module must export default an async (ctx) => Promise<T> function. It is responsible for registering any tools it needs.

lodestar action list / lodestar action describe <action-id>

Introspect the registered tool catalogue. fs.read and git.status are registered automatically against the current working directory so the catalogue is non-empty without launching a session.

lodestar action list
lodestar action describe fs.read

lodestar trace inspect <event-id> — debug

Look up a single event envelope by id. Debug-grade output (raw JSON); prefer lodestar report for anything user-facing.

lodestar trace inspect <event-id>
lodestar trace inspect <event-id> --session session-... --project my-proj

lodestar probe <name>

Run one of the probes in packs/lodestar-core/probes/. Probes are spec, not test scaffolding — when they fail, the change is wrong, not the probe.

lodestar probe poison
lodestar probe guard-import

lodestar harness run / lodestar harness list

Drive a whole probe pack instead of a single probe. run executes every probe in the pack and prints an aggregate summary (a failing probe does not abort the run); list inspects the pack's manifest without executing anything. By default run records each probe run as a synthetic observation in the event log so the run is itself auditable via lodestar report.

lodestar harness run                       # the first-party lodestar-core pack
lodestar harness run --pack ./packs/mine   # a local pack directory
lodestar harness run --no-record           # skip event-log recording (CI)
lodestar harness run --allow-env LODESTAR_TEST_DATABASE_URL  # forward one host var to probes
lodestar harness run --pack ./packs/mine --allow-unsigned   # load an unsigned local pack (sandboxed)
lodestar harness run --pack ./packs/mine --no-sandbox       # opt out of the OS sandbox (audited)
lodestar harness run --pack ./packs/mine --allow-read ./fixtures --allow-host 10.0.0.5:5432
lodestar harness list

run exits non-zero if any probe fails, so it works as a CI gate.

Each probe is spawned under a scoped environment — a fresh empty HOME + inherited PATH, never the host process.env (#114, ADR-0022) — so a potentially-third-party probe cannot read host secrets it was not granted. --allow-env <NAME> (repeatable) forwards a single host var into the probes; it is the explicit operator allowlist (the pack manifest cannot widen the env). The first-party DB-gated probes need --allow-env LODESTAR_TEST_DATABASE_URL, which the repo's probes:all / probes:safety scripts already pass.

Each probe is also spawned inside an OS sandbox (#121, ADR-0023) — sandbox-exec on macOS, bubblewrap on Linux — confining its filesystem (writes to a per-run scratch; reads to the pack dir + --allow-read <path>) and outbound network (loopback + --allow-host <host[:port]>). It is on by default for external packs and off for the two bundled first-party packs (which self-test the runner); --sandbox / --no-sandbox force it either way, and it fails closed if no mechanism is available (--no-sandbox is the audited opt-out). Both --allow-read / --allow-host are operator-only — the manifest cannot widen them. Egress is coarse: macOS scopes --allow-host by port (SBPL can't filter by host, so it must carry a port — 10.0.0.5:5432 means any host on 5432 — and the probe must connect by IP, since DNS is denied); Linux shares the host network once any host is allow-listed. An OS-primitive boundary, not kernel-grade containment.

A pack manifest is verified on load (ADR-0017). A bundled first-party pack (lodestar-core / coding-agent-safety), when the CLI runs from its own source tree, ships unsigned and loads automatically. Every other case — a --pack <path>, an arbitrarily-named bare pack, or any bare pack when the CLI is installed under a project's node_modules (where a name could otherwise collide with the project's own ./packs/<name>) — must either:

• carry a valid Ed25519 author signature whose author you pin with --author-key <author-id>=<spki-pem-file> (repeatable), or
• be loaded with --allow-unsigned (the explicit opt-out — no silent default).

Trust keys off the resolved location, not the argument syntax, so an unsigned local packs/acme cannot masquerade as first-party. A signed pack is always fully verified against the pinned keys, and a content-digest mismatch (probe bytes swapped under a still-valid signature) is rejected.

lodestar harness calibrate <session-id>

Score a session's stated belief confidence against realised outcome per calibration_class (ECE / Brier / calibration-gap, flagged classes), print the markdown report, and — unless --no-emit — record the verdict as a durable calibration.computed@1 governed event so calibration drift is auditable and replayable. The calibrator only measures; emitting the event is this separate publish step (ADR-0011). The recorded cursor is a replay key: re-running over the same window reproduces the verdict.

lodestar harness calibrate session-1779551238212               # print + record
lodestar harness calibrate session-… --no-emit                 # preview only
lodestar harness calibrate session-… --out calibration.md      # also write md

lodestar pack keygen / publish / attest / add / search / index-sign

The trust-pack author + consumer + attestation + discovery flow (ADR-0019 / ADR-0020 / ADR-0021). keygen mints an Ed25519 keypair for one role — --author (signs manifests), --attester (signs badges), or --index (signs discovery indexes) — private key written 0600, never on argv. publish freezes a pack's probe files, computes a content digest over them, signs the manifest in place, and self-verifies (the signing key comes from --key or LODESTAR_AUTHOR_KEY, never argv). attest issues a locally-verifiable signed badge into the pack's badges/ directory — a probe_results summary of a real run, or a security_scan verdict from --scan <file> — bound to the pack's manifest hash (the attester key comes from --key or LODESTAR_ATTESTER_KEY). add resolves a pinned source via a non-executing fetch — no npm install lifecycle script or git hook runs — and verifies the signature + content digest against operator-pinned author keys before any pack code could run, then installs the verified bytes, records the immutable pin in a lockfile, and surfaces the pack's badges verified against pinned attester keys. An unsigned or content-mismatched pack is rejected unless --allow-unsigned is explicit; badges are advisory and never gate the add.

search / list are the read-side discovery surface: fetch one or more pinned static discovery indexes (--index <source>: a path, file:, or https URL), verify each against pinned index-publisher keys (--index-key + the config's index_publisher_keys; fail closed unless --allow-unsigned-index), and filter the listings locally by --coverage / --invariant / a text arg (--json for raw hits). An index advertises but never authorizes — choosing a listed pack still routes through pack add (re-verified against your pinned author keys) before anything installs, so a hostile or tampered index can mis-list or omit but never make a forged pack verify. A single bad index is skipped, not fatal. index-sign is the thin publisher side: sign an authored index file in place + self-verify.

lodestar pack keygen --author acme --out acme-author            # mint an author keypair
lodestar pack keygen --attester acme-ci --out acme-ci           # mint an attester keypair
lodestar pack keygen --index acme-index --out acme-index        # mint an index-publisher keypair
lodestar pack publish --pack ./packs/mine --author acme --key acme-author.key
lodestar pack attest  --pack ./packs/mine --kind probe_results \
  --attester acme-ci --key acme-ci.key --author-key acme=acme-author.pub   # run + sign a badge
lodestar pack add npm:@acme/safety-pack@1.2.0 \
  --integrity sha512-… --author-key acme=acme-author.pub \
  --attester-key acme-ci=acme-ci.pub                            # pinned + verified, badges surfaced
lodestar pack add git:https://github.com/acme/packs.git#<40-hex-sha> \
  --author-key acme=acme-author.pub
lodestar pack add local:./packs/mine --author-key acme=acme-author.pub
lodestar pack index-sign --index-file ./pack-index.json \
  --publisher acme-index --key acme-index.key                   # sign an authored discovery index
lodestar pack search --index https://acme.example/pack-index.json \
  --index-key acme-index=acme-index.pub --coverage egress       # verify + filter listings locally

Consumers pin author keys (and, separately, attester keys, and index-publisher keys) in .lodestar/pack-trust.json (or --trust-config), the same shape as the proxy's approvals.authorized_keys. The recorded pins live in .lodestar/packs.lock.json.

Exit codes

• 0 — success
• 1 — operational failure (loop threw, event-log write failed, …)
• 2 — usage error
• 3 — resource not found (no events for session, no event with id, …)